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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates why and how the geographical scope of the security 
community centered around the European Union (EU) is expanding. It starts from the 
assumption that the EU itself is a ‘tightly-coupled mature pluralistic security 
community’. The analysis of the expansion of this peaceful area is based on the 
theoretical framework first  designed by Karl Deutsch and  later  developed by 
Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. Contrary to the logic of the adage ‘si vis 
pacem para bellum’, I argue that the security community is expanding because the 
EU’s own origins and self-perception are driven by an ambition to create lasting 
peace. The key mechanisms I explore are the EU’s enlargement and neighborhood 
policies, which are best understood when analyzed against the concept of 
concentric circles: the regional EU-centered security community is a multi-speed 
security community, stronger at its core and weaker as it spreads towards its margins. 
 Vincent Laporte 
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One of the strengths of the EU is the way it brings 
its member states together, establishing a habit 
of co-operation and trust. We would like our 
neighbors to share more fully in that process.1 
 
Introduction: an ever wider peaceful Europe – from theory to practice 
 
“Never before in world history have a number of sovereign states, of which some 
were formerly mortal enemies, freely decided to collaborate within new institutions 
that are both supranational and intergovernmental, and to jointly exercise their 
sovereignty through an interstate and transnational process rooted in their civil 
spheres.”2 This paper deals with the question why and how the geographical scope 
of the ‘security community’ which has the European Union (EU) at its core is 
expanding. I refer to the geographical area concerned – comprised of the EU and 
of its neighbors – as the ‘EU security community’, since I argue that it is the EU as a 
core which is progressively expanding its security community towards its peripheries. 
Following the theoretical work of Deutsch,3 as interpreted by Adler and Barnett, 
“[s]tates can become embedded in a set of social relations that can be properly 
understood as a community. Sometimes a community of states will establish pacific 
relations, sometimes a community will not. But those that do have formed a security 
community”.4 Countries belonging to a particular security community do not use war 
(or the threat thereof) to settle their differences. The same scholars have developed 
a variety of typologies aiming at differentiating several kinds of security communities, 
based on the depth of their integration.5  
Progressively built upon the desire to put an end to the succession of wars on the 
continent, the EU is today the institutional embodiment of the creation of a common 
identity for European states and populations. Integrated more and more deeply 
since World War II, the latter do not use, or threaten to use, collective violence to 
resolve their disputes, thus making the EU a ‘security community’. It is a ‘pluralistic’ 
                                                 
1 W. Hague, “A bold offer to our southern neighbors”, European Voice, 14 April 2011. 
2 M. Telò, International Relations: A European Perspective, Farnham, Ashgate, 2009, p. 3. 
3  K. Deutsch et al.,  Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957. 
4 E. Adler & M. Barnett, “A framework for the study of security communities”, in E. Adler & M. 
Barnett (eds.), Security Communities, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 37 
[emphasis added]. 
5 See ibid. and Deutsch et al., op.cit. For a summary, see V. Laporte, The European Union, an 
Expanding Security Community?, Master’s thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2011, pp. 6-12. EU Diplomacy Papers 6/2012 
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one because it is not governed by a single government and a fully shared set of 
rules. Moreover, the EU security community is in the ‘mature’ phase of its 
development because of the extent and nature of the interactions among its 
members. Finally, it is a ‘tightly-coupled’ one because of the existence of an over-
arching security-related policy cooperation. As a result, the EU itself can be classified 
as a ‘tightly-coupled mature pluralistic security community’.6 
Around the EU, a “European zone of peace”7 has been developing. This is due to the 
fact that the EU’s neighborhood  has progressively become a successful security 
community, where states and populations have come to share common norms of 
behavior and understandings.  Deutsch identifies such a phenomenon as 
“dependable expectations of peaceful change”.8  
I argue that the security community is expanding because the EU’s origins and self-
perception are driven by the ambition to create lasting peace. The key mechanisms 
I explore are the EU’s enlargement and neighborhood  policies, which are best 
understood when analyzed against the concept of concentric circles: the regional 
EU-centered security community is a multi-speed security community, stronger at its 
core and weaker as it spreads towards its margins.  
My goal is to analyze the modalities through which this peace-prone environment is 
spreading throughout the European continent. In order to do so, I assess the reasons 
why the EU security community is an expanding one by addressing the motivations 
behind the EU’s policies towards its neighbors. In this respect, I emphasize the peace-
driven ambition of the ‘founding fathers’ of the European integration project and link 
it to the more pragmatic underpinnings of the EU’s self-perception as a security actor 
in its neighborhood. 
 
Reasons for the geographical expansion of the EU security community 
 
The geographical expansion of the EU security community aims at bringing long-
lasting peace to the continent. It follows two complementary rationales: a 
conceptual one, as well as a pragmatic one.  
 
                                                 
6 For more details, see Laporte, op.cit., pp. 26-31. 
7 E. Kavalski, Extending the European Security Community: Constructing Peace in the Balkans, 
London, Tauris Academic Studies, 2008, p. 4. 
8 Deutsch et al., op.cit., p. 5. Vincent Laporte 
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The EU and peace promotion in its neighborhood – a conceptual perspective 
 
A recurring debate about the EU’s motivations for action in its neighborhood is the 
‘altruistic’ versus ‘self-interested’ actor dichotomy. Does the EU aim at promoting 
peace by shaping its neighborhood through peaceful and ideational processes or 
does it want to further  its own preferences by using any available instruments, 
including coercive ones? 
 
The EU as an altruistic actor 
 
From the official rhetoric emanating from a number of EU documents, a strong 
commitment to export peace-prone practices to the neighboring countries can be 
distilled. As noted by Smith, “[t]he factors driving such heavy EU engagement in its 
neighborhood are fairly obvious ones, including […] a shared sense of responsibility 
for repairing the Cold War split of Europe”.9 It seems that as an effective security 
community, the EU feels that it has a duty to help and show its neighbors how to 
interact peacefully. Following the idea that the European integration project was a 
revolt against Europe’s own violent past,10 one ought to see the geographical 
expansion of the EU security community as a way of fully implementing this ambition 
throughout the continent.  
Nevertheless, the limits of such an approach need to be stressed. The idea that the 
EU behaves in a purely altruistic manner towards its neighbors, as suggested by the 
EU’s official rhetoric, overlooks the fact security-related issues are deeply embedded 
in the Union’s way of thinking. Moreover, the EU has put more emphasis on the 
development of peaceful interactions through a kind of ‘hub-and-spoke’ model, 
where the EU is at the center spreading the norms of ‘good’ behavior. Even though 
this argument will have to be nuanced, one can see in this logic – as well as in the 
limited promotion by the EU of regional cooperation initiatives of which it would not 
be part – a willingness to maintain control over the way in which these peaceful 
interactions evolve. 
 
                                                 
9 K. Smith, “Enlargement and European order”, in C. Hill & M. Smith (eds.), International 
Relations and the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 271. 
10 O. Waever, “Insecurity, security, and asecurity in the West European non-war community”, 
in E. Adler & M. Barnett (eds.), Security Communities, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1998, p. 90. EU Diplomacy Papers 6/2012 
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The EU as a ‘peaceful hegemon’ 
 
An alternative explanation is the claim that the EU is actually expanding for its own 
benefit, as any given institutional setting has an inherent tendency to try to broaden 
its scope of action and influence. This  notion is, in fact, corroborated by various 
statements in key EU documents, most notably in the 2003 European Security 
Strategy (ESS): “It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-
governed. Neighbors who are engaged in violent conflict […] on its borders all pose 
problems for Europe”.11 According to Ian Manners, the EU ought to be considered a 
“normative power”: 
Conceptions of the EU as either a civilian power or a military 
power, both located in discussions of capabilities, need to be 
augmented with a focus on normative power of an ideational 
nature characterized by common principles and a willingness to 
disregard Westphalian conventions. [The EU’s] ability to shape 
conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations needs to be 
given much greater attention.12 
 
Taking this into consideration, one could then be tempted to view the EU as a 
‘peaceful empire’. However, this might prove to be a contradiction in terms. In light 
of historical experiences, it is difficult to conceive of an empire’s geographical 
expansion as being peaceful. The way out of this conceptual deadlock is straight-
forward: if the notions of normative power and empire are combined, the 
contradiction fades away. As suggested by Petiteville, the concepts of ‘soft power’ 
and ‘attractive power’ brought together by Nye are of particular relevance in this 
respect.13 The point here for the EU is to exert its power of attraction towards its 
neighbors through the norms and values which constitute its ‘raison d’être’. 
According to Nye, the EU – as a symbol of the unification of Europe – carries in itself 
an important degree of legitimacy as a ‘soft power’.14 
I believe  that to a certain degree the EU acts in a self-interested way when 
expanding its security community towards its neighbors, who are receptive to the 
                                                 
11 European Council, European Security Strategy – A secure Europe in a better world, Brussels, 
12 December 2003, p. 7. 
12 I.  Manners, “Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2002, vol. 40, no. 2, p. 239. 
13 See F. Petiteville, “Le rôle international de l’UE et la théorie des relations internationales”, in 
F. Mérand & R. Schwok (eds.), L'Union européenne et la sécurité internationale : Théories et 
pratiques, Genève, Bruylant-Academia, 2009, p. 65. 
14 See J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 
2004, pp. 6 & 77. Vincent Laporte 
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EU’s intentions and tend to welcome them. On this point, one should nevertheless 
bear in mind the risk for the EU to find itself entrapped by what Kennedy referred to 
as “imperial overstretch”.15 Following this logic, there is an inherent pattern in the 
geographical expansion of an empire. The problem arises when this expansion 
exceeds the absorption capacity of the empire. If one is to see the EU as such, then 
opening the debate of imperial overstretch makes sense – particularly with regards 
to the enlargement process, as pointed out by Winkler when assessing the risk of 
formally integrating Turkey into the EU.16 
However, this additional difficulty can be overcome by looking at the EU as a 
peaceful empire ‘by invitation’: the EU’s neighbors seek and welcome their 
integration within the EU security community. Given the fact that the EU is the 
dominant economic and political power on the European continent, it is indeed 
possible to describe the EU as a ‘peaceful hegemon’. This brings us back to Adler 
and Barnett who suggest that “social learning frequently occurs through a 
communicative exchange in the context of power asymmetries”.17 The result of this 
intellectual construction leads me to finally share Balfour’s opinion:  
Inconsistency remains one of the major setbacks in the EU’s self-
portrayal as a principled actor. The literature on the subject assumes 
a dichotomy between principles and interests […], an assumption 
that hides an implication that principles would reflect some 
‘genuineness’ of the EU whereas interests would be inherently 
‘selfish’. […] [T]his dichotomy appears tenuous, and the relationship 
between ‘principles’ and ‘interests’ should perhaps be challenged 
or seen on a continuum.18 
 
The expansion of the European integration project – an empirical perspective 
 
This sub-section addresses the reasons underpinning the geographical expansion of 
the EU security community to its neighbors through a more pragmatic approach. As 
such, it logically brings my analysis closer to the subsequent section, analyzing the 
mechanisms of this expansion. Both enlargement and neighborhood policies are 
means to respond to security-related historical evolutions. 
 
                                                 
15 See P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Power 
from 1500 to 2000, New York, Random House, 1987. 
16 H.A. Winkler, “Wir erweitern uns zu Tode”, Die Zeit, no. 4602, 2002. 
17 Adler & Barnett, op.cit., p. 45 [emphasis added]. 
18 R. Balfour, “Principles of democracy and human rights”, in S. Lucarelli & I. Manners (eds.), 
Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 115. EU Diplomacy Papers 6/2012 
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The EU as an inherently expanding project – the experience of enlargement  
 
Creating a ‘European zone of peace’ was at the core of the ambition of the 
‘founding fathers’ of the European integration project, which, from an institutional 
perspective, led to the creation of the EU.19 In this respect, the integration process 
remains incomplete as long as it does not incorporate all ‘European states’.20 The 
point here is straightforward: enlargement has always been considered to be the 
most efficient mechanism to pacify interstate relations on the European continent.  
Consequently, the expansion of the EU security community drives enlargement. 
These two elements – the deepening of the integration process and the widening 
through successive enlargements –  ought to be seen as mutually reinforcing. As 
stated in the ESS,  
Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The 
violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a 
period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history. 
[…] Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a 
united and peaceful continent.21 
 
The EU as a regional security actor – the Western Balkans experience 
 
It is, however, not only through successive enlargements that the EU has been trying 
to expand its security community. It is here necessary to distinguish between the 
expansion of the EU per se (only through enlargements) and the expansion of the 
security community, which has the EU at its core. 
Through mechanisms that will be explored in the next section, the EU is expanding its 
security community in a way that is coherent with its willingness to act and to be 
perceived as a regional security actor. The development of the EU’s involvement in 
the Western Balkans is the best example for the claim that the EU’s actions are based 
on a mix of the two abovementioned conceptual approaches which, ultimately, 
enable it to be a regional security actor.22 I chose the case of the Western Balkans to 
illustrate my argument because the situation there during the 1990s provides the 
                                                 
19 See Laporte, op.cit., pp. 19-22. 
20 One could then link, in fine, the expansion of the EU security community to the enlargement 
of the EU itself – with reference to Article 49 TEU: “Any European State which respects the 
values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a 
member of the Union”. 
21 European Council, op.cit., p. 1. 
22 For a detailed analysis, see Kavalski, op.cit., pp. 118-154. Vincent Laporte 
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‘worst-case scenario’ – both in terms of geographical proximity and intensity – of a 
succession of armed conflicts at the doorsteps of the EU. This experience turned out 
to be a dramatic failure for the EU and marked a turning point in its action and 
rhetoric towards its neighbors. Therefore, I argue that the Western Balkans was the 
region where the EU had –  and still has –  the strongest motivation to expand its 
security community. As expressed in the ESS, “Europe still faces security threats and 
challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not 
disappeared from our continent”.23 Moreover, this is a case highlighting the EU’s 
pragmatic rationale since, in its other peripheries, the EU’s motives for action are only 
weaker forms of the same. 
In sum, the EU security community tries to expand both in ideational and pragmatic 
terms. The European Union perceives itself as both a normative power and a 
peaceful hegemon, thus translating its quest for peace in logics which are at the 
roots of its successive enlargements and of its willingness to act as a regional security 
actor in its neighborhood. 
 
Mechanisms of the geographical expansion of the EU security community 
 
This section analyzes how the EU security community is expanding. It aims at 
answering the ‘how’ part of my research question. This study will. In order to take into 
account the different degrees of integration of the neighboring countries within this 
security community, several case studies, from the most to the least integrated EU’s 
neighbors, are necessary: the Western Balkans, Turkey, the eastern part of the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and finally the southern one. This will enable 
me to look at the tools, patterns, but also limits of this expansion. 
Geographically, I limit my study to the countries that are considered to be neighbors 
of the EU and for which diplomatic relations with the EU and its member states are 
stable. The latter element de facto  excludes Belarus, Syria, Libya and Algeria – 
countries that were supposed to join the ENP framework but have, so far, not agreed 
to any Action Plan with the EU. I consider these four countries to be outside the EU 
security community – or at least at its furthest margins. Russia was originally thought to 
be part of the ENP, but opted out of this policy. I therefore exclude Russia from my 
                                                 
23 European Council, op.cit. EU Diplomacy Papers 6/2012 
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study and thus avoid the debate over the possible existence of a security community 
‘from Vancouver to Vladivostok’.24 
At the other end of the spectrum, I will not examine in great detail the situation of the 
non-EU countries that have joined the  European Free Trade Association (EFTA) –
Switzerland and the three non-EU members of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
(Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). As these four states are also parties  to the 
Schengen Agreement, I argue that they are almost on an equal footing with the 
twenty-seven member states of the EU, in the sense that they are at the core of the 
EU security community. As a result, this study focuses on the candidate and potential 
candidate countries, as well as the countries being integrated in the framework of 
the ENP. 
Concerning the timeframe of my analysis, I will mainly focus on the post-2004 period 
because this year corresponds to the first phase of the Eastern enlargement as well 
as to the operationalization phase of the ENP. Moreover, the objective of my case 
studies-based approach is to show through which mechanisms the EU security 
community expands. This will be relevant in order to assess the different depths of this 
‘multi-speed’ security community. I emphasize the ‘differentiation’ aspect 
characterizing the EU’s approach. Finally, I will remain at a macro level of analysis 
and I will simply refer to more in-depth studies when available and necessary.  
 
Candidates and potential candidates – the enlargement methodology 
 
As put forward in the ESS Implementation Report: “Within our continent, enlargement 
continues to be a powerful driver for stability, peace and reform”.25 In order to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the peace-prone tools at work throughout the 
enlargement process mechanism, this section examines the cases of the Western 
Balkans and of Turkey. 
 
The Western Balkans – the ‘good neighborly relations’ criterion 
 
Since the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, stability in the Western Balkans has been 
of primary concern to the EU. The outbreak of the 1999 Kosovo crisis proved to be a 
                                                 
24 This paper does not take into account the role played by NATO in the formation, 
development and expansion of the contemporary European zone of peace.  
25 Council of the European Union, Report about the implementation of the European Security 
Strategy – Providing security in a changing world, Brussels, 11 December 2008, p. 6. Vincent Laporte 
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turning point in this respect. Today, the countries of the region26 are brought together 
by the EU in the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), with 
the implementation of individual Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs).27 
The path towards accession to the EU itself is at a different stage for each of these 
countries, ranging from the upcoming accession of Croatia in 2013 to the member-
ship applications of FYROM, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania28, without forgetting 
but also to the ‘potential candidate’ status of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. 
My argument concerning the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU security 
community is that the EU has developed two main tools, as emphasized in the ESS 
Implementation Report: “throughout the region, co-operation and good neighborly 
relations are indispensable”, the latter being a specific kind of conditionality.29 
The EU used the mechanism of conditionality for all of its enlargements. However, it 
was more clearly defined at the 1993 Copenhagen European Council and has 
subsequently been tightly monitored in the build-up to the 2004/2007 Eastern 
enlargement. The so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’, which applicant countries have 
to meet before joining the EU, concern “[t]he stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union”.30 Conditionality 
is seen as the key instrument for enlargement, encouraging stability, reforms and 
development. 
In the specific case of the Western Balkans countries, the EU has insisted upon an 
additional aspect of political conditionality.31 Its scope goes beyond that laid out at 
                                                 
26  Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, FYROM and Albania. For Kosovo, 
negotiations on a possible Stabilization Tracking Mechanisms are still ongoing. 
27 The case of Kosovo is more problematic in this respect. Negotiations on a ‘Stabilization 
Tracking Mechanism’ started in 2003 and are still ongoing. The EU is divided on the way 
forward since some EU member states not recognizing Kosovo’s independence. The SAAs 
with Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been signed but have not yet entered into force. 
These two countries benefit, however, from Interim Agreements. 
28 Albania applied for EU membership in 2009 but is not yet considered as ‘candidate 
country‘. 
29 Council of the European Union, op. cit. 
30 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/93, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 
1993. 
31 T. Freyburg & S. Richter, “National identity matters: the limited impact of EU political 
conditionality in the Western Balkans”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 17, no. 2, March 
2010, p. 265. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is 
also part of this political conditionality. EU Diplomacy Papers 6/2012 
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Copenhagen and includes criteria such as “the fight against corruption, social and 
cultural rights, and good neighborly relations among states”.32 As summarized by 
Trauner, and as part of an update of the SAP (1997) and of the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe (1999), this last additional criterion is obviously rooted in the EU’s 
ambitions to restore peace in the region and to promote regional cooperation.33 The 
Western Balkans are today much more integrated into the EU security community 
framework than they were a decade ago. Once again, I emphasize the fact that 
the Kosovo crisis was crucial in this evolution. 
 
Turkey – the ‘elephant in the room’? 
 
Moving further South East from the EU, Turkey constitutes a real challenge for the 
argument according to which the EU is successful in expanding its security 
community. Its tense relations with Greece – mainly over the Cyprus issue – as well as 
problematic relations with Armenia, could lead one to think that the EU security 
community will reach its limit before crossing the Bosphorus. However, I consider that 
these tensions are unlikely to eventually turn into an armed conflict.34 Several EU 
policies towards Turkey are also enabling the country to engage in a more peaceful 
way with its neighbors. In addition to the key ‘carrot’ of the perspective of EU 
accession, Turkey already benefits, for example, from a Customs Union Agreement, 
which aims at integrating EU and Turkish markets.35 The rules covering the movement 
of people are, however, much stricter than those applying to a majority of Western 
Balkan countries, thus limiting the people-to-people interactions between the EU and 
Turkey. In addition, the debate over a possible Turkish accession to the EU has been 
harmful for the development of a stronger EU security community in the region. This 
                                                 
32 O. Anastasakis, “The EU’s political conditionality in the Western Balkans: towards a more 
pragmatic approach”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 8, no. 4, December 
2008, p. 367 [emphasis added]. 
33  F. Trauner, “From membership conditionality to policy conditionality: EU external 
governance in South Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 16, no. 5, 2009, 
pp. 778-779. 
34 A deep analysis of this issue would exceed the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it suffices 
to point to the fact that both Turkey and Greece are members of NATO and thus already 
embedded in a set of institutional settings providing them with strong incentives to settle their 
bilateral disputes peacefully. 
35 Since 1996, most goods can circulate freely between Turkey and the EU. However, this 
customs union does not cover agriculture, services or public procurement. Vincent Laporte 
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problem can be apprehended through the suggestion made by some EU leaders 
and scholars to create a so-called ‘privileged partnership’.36 
Turkey, as a Western-oriented, secular state with […] a significant 
geostrategic position appeared to be a natural partner for the 
Community. The natural dilemma for the European elites, a dilemma 
which has been evident right from the beginning and has been 
carried on to the present day, is whether to treat Turkey as a natural 
“insider” or an important “outsider” in the context of the on-going 
European integration project.37 
 
This ‘insider’ versus ‘outsider’ controversy touches upon Turkish accession to the EU 
per se. Nevertheless, it should clearly be considered as a secondary aspect of 
Turkey’s integration with the wider EU security community. And yet, Turkey’s 
integration with the EU security community is not as deep as that of the Western 
Balkans, even though Turkey is already a candidate whereas some Western Balkans 
countries remain only potential candidates. This fact diminishes the importance of 
the candidate versus potential candidate dichotomy in the framework of my 
analysis. The relevant distinction is the geographical one I suggested by separating 
Turkey from the Western Balkans. 
 
ENP countries – integration without accession? 
 
As summarized in the ESS, the integration of candidates and potential candidates 
with the core of the EU security community  
increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. 
Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of 
the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with 
whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations […]. It is not in 
our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in 
Europe.38 
 
Slightly further away from the EU, there are numerous neighboring countries that do 
not have the status of candidate or potential candidate for EU membership. They 
have been brought together under the umbrella of the European Neighborhood 
                                                 
36 For instance, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel or the former French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy. 
37  Z. Önis, “An awkward partnership: Turkey’s relations with the European Union in 
comparative historical perspective”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 7, no. 1, 
2001, p. 105. 
38 European Council, European Security Strategy, op.cit., p. 8. EU Diplomacy Papers 6/2012 
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Policy.39 I divide the analysis of the ENP peace-prone mechanism into two distinct 
areas, considering successively its eastern and southern parts. 
 
The Eastern Partnership dilemma – pre-accession or buffer zone? 
 
The Eastern Partnership –  within the ENP –  gathers Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova and the Ukraine. According to the ESS Implementation Report, its “goal is to 
strengthen the prosperity and stability of these countries, and thus the security of the 
EU”.40 Interestingly, several tools developed in this framework deal with the mobility of 
people, that is, with strengthening their interactions. Moldova and Ukraine could be 
seen as a ‘natural’ zone of expansion for the EU security community. However, no 
official explicit perspective of EU membership has been granted to them. Their 
strategic importance for European security is, however, acknowledged by this 
Report, insofar as these two countries need to peacefully resolve the Transnistrian 
conflict.41 In this respect, the EU supports the OSCE’s ‘5+2’ talks and promotes 
confidence-building measures. Overall, this region seems rather stable, especially 
compared to the South Caucasus. On that point, “new concerns have arisen over 
the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’” in the South Caucasus.42 The conflicts in question 
regard Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan 
(Nagorno-Karabakh). German and Moustakis rightly observe that  
[t]he unresolved dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan […] is 
one of the most worrying unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus region 
[…]. Furthermore, in a similar fashion to the on-going separatist 
disputes in Georgia, the protracted conflict undermines […] the 
development of a wider security community.43 
 
Consequently, the EU decided to engage in this region in order to encourage the 
development of peaceful interactions among these three countries. This is 
particularly obvious in their inclusion in the ENP and in the appointment of an EU 
                                                 
39 Article 8(1) TEU stipulates that: “The Union shall develop a special relationship with 
neighboring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborliness, 
founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations 
based on co-operation”. 
40 Council of the European Union, op.cit., p. 10. 
41 Ibid., p. 6. 
42 Ibid. 
43 T. German & F. Moustakis, Securing Europe: Western Interventions Towards a New Security 
Community, London, Tauris Academic Studies, 2009, p. 129. Vincent Laporte 
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Special Representative for the region in 2003.44 The Georgian-Russian armed conflict 
during the summer of 2008 excludes even more clearly Russia from my definition of 
the EU security community. In the framework of the Eastern Partnership, the 
problematic relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the most serious 
challenge to be dealt with.  
However, the EU remains rather silent and distant with regards to the potential 
conflicts in this region, and I consider that this is the best illustration of the way in 
which  the remoteness of the perspective of EU membership hinders the 
strengthening of the EU security community. Stuck between the potential prospect of 
EU accession in a distant future and the mere position of a buffer zone between the 
EU and Russia, the countries of the Eastern Partnership are less integrated into the EU 
security community than the Western Balkans and Turkey. 
 
The ambiguity of peace promotion in the Mediterranean – a security/democracy 
bargain? 
 
Compared to the eastern part of the European continent, the situation is even less 
clear in the EU’s southern neighborhood. It is widely recognized that this region is not 
meant to become part –  even in a remote future –  of the EU.45 The ‘carrot’ of 
membership is not available there when spreading the EU security community. 
However, as pointed out by Furness, “the EU has tried to encourage southern 
neighbors to engage in ‘comprehensive’ regional security cooperation based on a 
model reliant on multilateralism, rules and ‘shared values’”.46 Through the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and then the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 
the EU has been trying to foster dialog and cooperation among its southern 
neighbors.47 
Since its launch in 1995, the EMP’s primary objective has been the development of a 
“political and security partnership to create an area of peace and stability”.48 
Additionally, as expressed in the ESS Implementation Report, the UfM – launched in 
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 4. 
45 Morocco submitted an application to join the then-European Communities in 1987. It was 
rejected on the grounds that Morocco was not a ‘European state’. 
46 M. Furness, “Exporting the security community? The EU and regional security cooperation in 
the Mediterranean”, Studia Diplomatica, vol. 61, no. 4, 2008, pp. 5-6. 
47 The EMP and the UfM do not have the same membership but will nevertheless be treated 
together, since their overall security-related objectives are the same. 
48 Balfour, op.cit., p. 124. EU Diplomacy Papers 6/2012 
  17 
July 2008 – provides a “renewed political moment to pursue this with our southern 
partners, through a wide-ranging agenda, including on […] migration. Addressing 
security threats […] will be an important part”.49 Yet, as Balfour argues, “[r]egional 
security and cooperation have been held hostage by the long-standing conflicts 
over Palestine-Israel and the Western Sahara”.50 These two conflicts are a central 
challenge to the expansion of the EU security community beyond the European 
continent. In both cases, the statehood of one of the parties is controversial and the 
use of large-scale violence is still a concrete prospect. 
Moreover, the expansion of the EU security community in this region is hindered by a 
dilemma that the EU, as a norm exporter, is unable to solve. I argue that – in this 
region especially – promoting peace and stability on the one hand and democracy 
and the rule of law on the other, might prove to be difficult to reconcile.51 As pointed 
out by Balfour, “it has been argued that security and stability are the central priorities 
of the EU member states in the region: political change towards democratization 
was perceived as potentially destabilizing and would thus be subordinated to the 
maintenance of regional stability”.52  
The ENP is meant to secure the EU’s neighborhood without necessitating further 
institutional enlargement, through the promotion of “shared values […] in the hope 
of promoting stability”.53 However, in the case of the Mediterranean, such logic 
seems somewhat difficult to implement.  Furness stresses in this regard that recent 
“European efforts to pursue hard security cooperation with Mediterranean partner 
governments have foundered on a lack of south Mediterranean commitment to the 
EMP’s ‘shared values’”.54 Hence, as suggested by Bremberg, the expansion of the EU 
security community in this region has to first find solutions for how to interact “in terms 
of developing shared norms of consultation and reciprocity together with the spread 
of common security practices”.55 To conclude, 
                                                 
49 Council of the European Union, op.cit., p. 10. 
50 Ibid. 
51 This dilemma is of particular relevance in times of popular uprising throughout the ‘Arab 
world’. 
52 Balfour, op.cit., p. 126. 
53 German & Moustakis, op.cit., p. 25. 
54 Furness, op.cit., p. 13. 
55 N. Bremberg, “Widened security, expanding community? On the development of EU civil 
protection as an emerging community of practice”, Paper presented at the ECPR/SGIR 7th 
Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010, pp. 25-
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[a] Euro-Mediterranean security community is a worthwhile long-term 
goal for European policymakers, not because it is necessarily 
achievable within a discrete timeframe, but because the process of 
working towards it promises much in terms of political stability and 
economic prosperity in the Mediterranean basin. […] Europeans 
managed this in Eastern Europe, with immensurable benefits for the 
security of EU member states. For Europeans, the security community 
remains a commodity well worth exporting.56 
 
Findings of the case studies 
 
According to a 2006 Special Eurobarometer, “[s]ome 70% of the EU population 
believes EU assistance to neighboring countries will reduce the risk of war and 
conflicts in Europe”.57 From an EU-centered perspective, much work remains to be 
done in order to further integrate the neighbors within the overall EU security 
community. A first step could involve increasing interactions with these countries and 
their populations, based on the assumption that this would favor the development of 
peaceful relations. This element ought to be stressed given the outcome of the same 
public survey, according to which only “[a] slight majority of the EU population (51%) 
is interested in what is happening in neighboring countries of the EU; a significant 
minority (48%), however, has little or no interest”.58  
The accession perspective is the most efficient mechanism through which countries 
become integrated into the wider EU security community. On the other hand, 
without providing such a perspective, the ENP also proves to be useful in integrating 
the EU’s neighbors. The respect of certain norms, the development of good 
neighborly relations and regional cooperation are the main tools through which both 
the enlargement and the neighborhood policy mechanisms aim at promoting 
stronger interactions and dependable expectations of peaceful change throughout 
the EU’s peripheries. I consider that this pattern is well captured by the concept of 
“cooperative security”, defined by Adler as 
a model of interstate relations in which disputes are expected to 
occur, but they are expected to do so within the limits of agreed 
upon norms and established procedures. It is, thus, the ‘natural’ 
security practice of security communities. More specifically, 
cooperative security is a collection of security practices, adopted 
mainly by multilateral institutions of security communities,  on the 
                                                 
56 Furness, op.cit., p. 26. 
57 European Commission, “Eurobarometer – The European Union and its neighbors”, Special 
Eurobarometer, no. 259, October 2006, p. 9. 
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premise that threats to the community’s security are best handled by 
confidence-building and dialogue, cooperative quality-of-life 
measures, and the promotion of regional identities, and, in particular, 
by the inclusion of neighboring states into the community as 
members or partners.59 
 
The overall dual  logic of my argumentation analyzing the mechanisms of the 
geographical expansion of the EU security community is finally summarized by a 
recent comment of British Foreign Secretary William Hague: 
The EU's historic achievement has been to aid the establishment of 
stable, prosperous and well-governed states in Europe, using the 
transformative power of enlargement. That project is not complete: 
the nations of the Western Balkans and Turkey, as well as others to 
the east, have a European future. The challenge now for the EU is 
how we can replicate that achievement to the south, transforming 
countries whose future will not lie within the EU, but whose success is 
intimately tied to European security.60 
 
“Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has increasingly but emphatically ‘flexed its 
muscles’ in Europe, assuming responsibility for an ever expanding geographical area 
–  primarily through enlargement and the expansion of its ‘security community’.”61 
After  analyzing  both the reasons and the mechanisms underpinning the 
geographical expansion of the EU security community, it seems clear that it is 
necessary to differentiate among the EU’s neighbors. Doing so requires going 
beyond the scope of the existing theoretical framework. Drawing on the concept of 
concentric circles, the next section allows a more advanced conceptualization of 
the progressive expansion of the EU security community. 
 
The EU security community meets the concept of concentric circles 
 
The EU security community is expanding to the neighbors at different speeds and in 
different depths. I argue that it is possible to systematize this differentiated evolution 
within the security community through the concept of concentric circles. 
 
                                                 
59 E. Adler, “The spread of security communities: communities of practice, self-restraint, and 
NATO’s post-Cold War transformation”, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 14, 
no. 2, June 2008, pp. 206-207. 
60 Hague, op. cit. 
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The concept of the concentric circles and the EU security community 
 
From a historical point of view, it is interesting to note that the first broad discussion of 
a Europe of concentric circles developed in the 1990s as a result of the end of the 
Cold War and as a way to envisage relations with the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs).  
In 1990 the Community compromised with the concentric circles 
approach […]. An integrated European Union would be at the 
center (therefore the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated); in the 
closest ring to the EU would be the prosperous, small members of the 
European Free Trade Association linked to the EU via the European 
Economic Area […]. The CEECs occupied the outer ring, […] while 
the Soviet Union, off on the outer fringes of Europe, did not figure 
highly at all.62 
 
This concept was systematized by then French Prime Minister Balladur63 and has since 
existed in the mindset of EU policymakers. It is officially conceived at the level of the 
EU institutions as a 
concept [that] involves a Europe made up of subsets of states which 
have achieved different levels of integration. It is not confined just to 
the integration structure of the European Union […]. Some […] talk of 
“the circle of shared law” (the Union's Member States), the 
“adjacent circle” (the countries outside the Union waiting to join it) 
and “more select circles” for the purpose of greater cooperation 
(the currency circle, the defense circle and so on).64  
 
It is worth noting that this conceptual approach blurs the divide between the EU’s 
internal and external policies, and it acts as a bridge between them. It is, however, 
also the source of some shortcomings, which I will now briefly outline. 
A first limit of the concept of concentric circles is the fact that few scholars and 
policymakers consider it to be practical “because it does not fit into established 
categories”.65 The logic underpinning this concept has more often been used when 
considering other aspects of the EU integration process – mainly economic ones.66 I 
argue, however, that the concept of concentric circles is particularly relevant for the 
                                                 
62 Ibid., p. 273. 
63 See E. Balladur, “Pour un nouveau Traité de l’Elysée”, Le Monde, no. 15 503, 50th year, 30 
November 1994. 
64 Europa Website, “Concentric Circles”, Summaries of EU Legislation – Glossary. Interestingly, 
this definition strictly follows the one suggested by Balladur. See Balladur, op.cit. 
65 Waever, op.cit., p. 100. 
66 See, for example, C. Tugendhat, “How to get Europe moving again”, International Affairs, 
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security aspects of the integration process. A parallel can be drawn with the 
perception of the EU as a peaceful hegemon developed earlier because, as 
Waever suggests,  
the EU could be seen as yet another instance of the best-tried 
method of peace provision in history: that a region does not have a 
balance-of-power among competing powers, but a clear though far 
from all-dominant center whose power extends radically with fading 
force, as a number of quasi-independent political units operate 
around the center with increasing independence as the distance to 
the center increases.67 
 
Another weakness concerning the way in which the concept of concentric circles 
has been presented in the literature is that it is constructed in mainly institutional 
rather than policy-oriented terms. I do not subscribe to this approach and I rather 
focus on a clearly delimited policy-area: the development of security through 
interactions. 
 
The expansion of the EU security community in concentric circles 
 
This sub-section takes into account the way in which the concept of concentric 
circles has been developed so far and – acknowledging my particular approach in 
this regard – applies it to the expansion of the EU security community. 
 
The various concentric circles of the EU security community’s expansion 
 
This part of my analysis is “based on the assumption that as of the second half of the 
1990s there is in Europe a stable ‘core of security’” and “this core of European 
security is surrounded by several peripheries”.68 Given the present shape of the EU 
security community and the findings of my case studies, I argue that one can 
broadly identify two peripheries. This first consists of candidates and potential 
candidates to EU membership, while the second embraces the countries actively 
involved in the ENP. I refer to the core of the EU security community as ‘Circle 1’, to 
the candidates and potential candidates as ‘Circle 2’, and to the ENP countries as 
‘Circle 3’.  
                                                 
67 Waever, op.cit. 
68 J. Hallenberg, “The extension of the European security community to the periphery: France 
in the Mediterranean and Finland and Sweden in the Baltic countries”, NATO Fellowship Final 
Report, Department of Strategic Studies, National Defense College, Stockholm, June 2000, 
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Moreover, a more thorough classification is possible when looking at the depth of 
integration within each circle. It is first relevant to emphasize the slight –  mainly 
institutional – difference between the EU members and the EFTA countries –circles 1a 
and 1b respectively. For the second circle, I would argue that it makes more sense to 
distinguish between the Western Balkans (2a) and Turkey (2b) than between 
candidates and potential candidates. ‘Circle 3’ has been treated with a similar 
logic. This is why the eastern part of the ENP (3a) has been dealt with separately from 
the southern part (3b). The rationale behind this clear-cut split is the complete lack of 
an EU accession perspective for the latter, while the former group of countries finds 
itself in a more uncertain position in this respect. 
Figure 1 classifies the various groups of countries depending on the depth of their 
integration with the European security community. 
 
Figure 1: Expansion of the EU security community in concentric circles 
 
Source: author’s compilation. 
 
This classification is only temporary: as suggested by the arrows, countries could 
slowly move towards the core of the EU security community. In addition, the list of 
countries to be integrated within this security community might evolve in the future, 
as suggested by the first arrow on the left. The solid lines do not represent hermetic or 
strong barriers to integration; they group together larger regions than the dashed 
lines. Finally, the number of concentric circles should not be seen as a fixed one. 
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The concentric circles and the depth of the current EU security community 
 
The last step is to bring together the various concentric circles identified and to 
match each of them with the relevant type of security community provided by Adler 
and Barnett.69 Each concentric circle identified in this framework corresponds to a 
particular element of the theoretical typology. Before going into detail, let me recall 
that this perspective of a single but ‘multi-speed’ security community does not exist 
in the literature yet.  
As already mentioned, the twenty-seven EU member states as well as the four EFTA 
members belong to the nucleus of the EU security community. These countries form 
the mature layer of the EU pluralistic security community. Upon further analysis, one 
might proceed with a further distinction. The expansion of the EU security community 
– a ‘tightly-coupled mature pluralistic security community’ – to the EFTA members 
creates an additional concentric circle, matching the criteria characterizing a rather 
‘loosely-coupled’ mature pluralistic security community. 
On a wider scale, candidate and potential candidate countries constitute the 
‘ascendant’ layer of this pluralistic security community. Once again, the findings 
drawn from my case studies require a distinction between the Western Balkans and 
Turkey. However, the typology provided by Adler and Barnett is not precise enough 
to apply a more detailed vocabulary to this distinction. It suffices to say that the 
Western Balkan countries are slightly more integrated into the EU security community 
than Turkey.  
Finally, I see the ENP countries as being the ‘nascent’ layer of this pluralistic security 
community. At this level, the case study led me to differentiate the Eastern 
Partnership from the EMP/UfM, with the eastern part of the ENP being more 
integrated into the EU security community than its southern part. 
Table 1 sums up the successive elements of the argumentation provided throughout 
this section. 
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Table 1: Depth of the EU security community 
Type of pluralistic security 
community 
Circles  Group of countries 
Mature 
Tightly-coupled 
1 
1a 
EU 27 
 
Loosely-coupled  1a +1b 
EU 27 + EFTA 4 
 
Ascendant  1+2 
1+ 2a 
EU 27 + EFTA 4 + Western Balkans 
 
1+ 2a+ 
2b 
EU 27 + EFTA 4 + Western Balkans + Turkey 
Nascent 
1+ 
2+ 3 
1+ 2+ 3a 
EU 27 + EFTA 4 + Western Balkans + Turkey + 
Eastern Partnership 
1+ 2+ 
3a+ 3b 
EU 27 + EFTA 4 + Western Balkans + Turkey + 
Eastern Partnership + EMP/UfM 
Source: author’s compilation. 
 
Conclusion: the EU at the core of an expanding European zone of peace 
 
This paper dealt with the question why and how the geographical scope of the EU 
security community is expanding. I argued that the security community is spreading 
out because the EU’s own origins and self-perception are driven by the ambition to 
create lasting peace. The key mechanisms are the EU enlargement and neighbor-
hood policies that are best combined with the concept of concentric circles: the 
regional EU-centered security community is a multi-speed security community, 
stronger at its core and weaker as it spreads towards its margins.  
Progressively built upon the desire to put an end to the succession of wars on the 
continent, the EU is today the institutional embodiment of the creation of a common 
identity for European  states and populations. Integrated more and more deeply 
since World War II, they do not use or threaten to use collective violence to resolve 
their disputes. Thanks to developing interactions, they know each other better, trust 
each other more, and therefore entertain dependable expectations of peaceful 
change. The conclusion I reach here is similar to Mayall's finding that the 
contemporary EU is “probably the most effective community security anywhere in 
the world”.70 
The EU is an expanding security community, in so far as it tends to encourage the 
development of peaceful interactions beyond its borders. It does so in order to 
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respond to both material (security-related) and ideational (peace-promotion-
related) incentives. These incentives go beyond the terms of reference – altruistic 
versus self-interested  –  of the mainly conceptual debate about the nature 
concerning the EU’s action in its neighborhood. In this regard, the EU acts as an 
‘aimant pacificateur’, using the mechanisms of its enlargement and neighborhood 
policies. This process follows a pattern of concentric circles, where the EU is the core 
and its neighbors represent several external circles, depending on the depth of their 
integration within the overall EU security community. Overall, the EU is an expanding 
security community, one that is stronger at its core and weaker at its margins. 
 Vincent Laporte 
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